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HOSTILE GATEKEEPING:  
THE STRATEGY OF ENGAGING 
WITH JOURNALISTS IN 
EXTREMISM REPORTING
Abdullahi Tasiu Abubakar
Abstract
This article broadly examines the relationship between strategic communications 
and journalism with specific reference to the issue of  violent extremism. Using 
a case study of  reporting on the Boko Haram conflict in Nigeria, it analyses the 
nature and consequences of  engagement among the various communicators 
involved. The primary data were drawn from focus groups and individual 
interviews with thirty-two journalists and strategic communicators, and from 
analysis of  Boko Haram videos and Nigerian security forces’ press releases. The 
findings suggest that journalists have a tense but interdependent relationship 
with strategic communicators that is characterised by conflict and cooperation, 
harassment and intimidation. Strategic communicators’ control of  the conflict 
theatre and use of  the Internet to reach audiences directly give them leverage 
in the relationship. They, however, rely on journalists to help enhance the reach 
and credibility of  their narratives, while journalists depend significantly on their 
media releases.
Keywords— gatekeeping, journalism, news values, Boko Haram, violent extremism, 
strategic communications
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Introduction and Background
Journalism is in crisis,1 and the art of  strategic communications is in the as-
cendency.2 Neither is accidental. A combination of  technological changes, eco-
nomic upheaval, and audiences’ distrust in news media has thrown much of  
the traditional media and professional journalism into turmoil.3 Conversely, the 
transformation of  the media landscape and the growing interest of  state and of  
non-state actors in the battles for the hearts and minds of  the public have raised 
the art of  strategic communications to new heights.4 The consequences are wide 
ranging. The rapid spread of  disinformation (deliberate spread of  erroneous 
information), misinformation (accidental or unwitting spread of  erroneous in-
formation), and hate speech is the most obvious. ‘Powerful new technology 
makes the manipulation and fabrication of  content simple, and social networks 
dramatically amplify falsehoods peddled by States, populist politicians, and dis-
honest corporate entities, as they are shared by uncritical publics.’5 Journalism 
‘loses ground’ and becomes a subject of  ‘existential attack’.6 
While strategic communicators reap benefits from the open-access nature of  
the Internet and the unfettered opportunities it offers them to reach and influ-
ence audiences, professional journalism is groaning under considerable strain.7 
Its business models are becoming increasingly unviable—epitomised by the col-
lapse of  many outlets, plummeting revenues, and staff  cutbacks.8 It faces severe 
criticisms from both the Right, who accuse it ‘of  peddling “fake news”’, and the 
1 Scholarship has touched on journalism’s crisis from differing perspectives. John Russial, Peter Laufer and 
Janet Wasko, ‘Journalism in Crisis?’, Javnost—The Public 22(4), (2015): 299–312; Robert McChesney, ‘Farewell to 
Journalism? Time for a Rethinking’, Journalism Practice 13(5-6), (2012): 682–94; Núria Almiron, Journalism in Crisis: 
Corporate Media and Financialization (New York: Hampton Press, 2010).
2 Monroe Price, Free Expression, Globalism and New Strategic Communication (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2015).
3 Alberto Ardèvol-Abreu and Homero Gil de Zúñiga, ‘Effects of  Editorial Media Bias Perception and Media 
Trust on the Use of  Traditional, Citizen, and Social Media News’, Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly 
94(3), (2017): 703–24.  
4 Price, Free Expression.
5 Cherilyn Ireton and Julie Posetti (eds.), Journalism, Fake News & Disinformation: Handbook for Journalism Education 
and Training (Paris: UNESCO, 2018), p. 15.
6 Ibid., p. 18.
7 McChesney, ‘Farewell to Journalism?’.
8 Russial, ‘Journalism in Crisis?’.
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Left, who blame it ‘for failing to play a robust monitorial role’.9 Although the 
industry is fighting back by adopting digital production practices and developing 
new business models,10 it still has a long way to go. Technological and economic 
changes play a role in this. 
Digital giants such as Facebook, Google, and Twitter are increasingly usurping 
the resources of  news organisations, depriving them of  advertising revenues, 
and reaping the benefits of  the journalism content news media create without 
paying for them and without facing the regulatory requirements applied to news 
organisations. They have developed a business model that aligns their economic 
interests with those of  advertisers and made fortunes from it.11 While this has 
helped spread new ideas, enhance creativity, expand commerce, boost business-
es, and bring economic prosperity to many, it has also created room for the 
weaponisation of  personal data12 and the manipulation of  vulnerable minds. 
As Dipayan Ghosh and Ben Scott argue, in the current marketplace enhanced 
by technology firms, all advertisers—‘whether they are pushing retail products, 
news stories, political candidates, or disinformation’—are basically alike: they all 
want to use the most ‘persuasive’ tools at their disposal.13 ‘The problem is that 
when disinformation operators leverage this system for precision propaganda, 
the harm to the public interest, the political culture, and the integrity of  democ-
racy is substantial and distinct from any other type of  advertiser.’14 
The impacts from disinformation frequently appear to manifest themselves in 
the rise of  hate politics, extremist ideologies, and identity-related violence. An 
aspect of  this can be seen in the way violent extremists, such as the so-called 
Islamic State of  Iraq and Syria (ISIS), al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, and al-Shabaab, 
easily exploit web technology to recruit new adherents, intimidate their adversar-
9 Des Freedman, ‘“Public Service” and the Journalism Crisis: Is the BBC the Answer?’, Television & New Media 
(2018): 1–16, p. 1.
10 Mark Deuze and Tamara Wutschge, ‘Beyond Journalism: Theorizing the Transformation of  Journalism’, 
Journalism 9(2), (2018): 165–85; Barbie Zelizer, What Journalism Could Be (Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press, 
2017); Jeffrey Alexander, ‘The Crisis of  Journalism Reconsidered: Cultural Power’, Fudan Journal of  Humanities and 
Social Sciences 8(1), (2015): 9–31. 
11 Dipayan Ghosh and Ben Scott, Digital Deceit: The Technologies Behind Precision Propaganda on the Internet (Cam-
bridge, MA: Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School, January 2018).  
12 Mark Bridge, ‘Tech Firms Have “Weaponised” Personal Data, Says Apple Chief  Tim Cook’, The Times (24 
October 2018). [accessed 24 October 2018].
13 Ghosh, Digital Deceit, p. 3.
14 Ibid.
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ies, and terrorise the citizenry.15 This is particularly problematic because, unlike 
most conventional online advertisers who buy space and slots to market their 
products, extremist groups operate surreptitiously, slipping in their messages on 
the Internet and social media and executing their deadly plans. Although tech-
nology companies and governments now use various cyber-policing techniques 
to contain them (and security services exploit terror groups’ cyber activity to 
counter such operations),16 extremist groups often evade these measures. And it 
is their ability to surprise—enhanced by the affordances of  new technology—
that strengthens their capability and sharpens their strategic communications 
efficacy.
Boko Haram has demonstrated its dexterity in this. Formed in Nigeria’s north-
east around 2002 as a youth Muslim movement aimed at establishing a Salafist 
state, the ISIS-linked group turned to terror campaigns after a series of  clashes 
with security forces.17 They have since become the deadliest insurgent group 
in Africa, blamed for the death of  over 30,000 people and the displacement 
of  three million others in Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon over the last 
decade.18 ‘Although it was their abduction of  276 schoolgirls from Chibok in 
Borno State in April 2014 that gave them global notoriety, Boko Haram mili-
tants committed far worse atrocities, such as beheadings and mass executions.’19 
They staged those attacks to attract media attention. It is a component of  their 
strategic communications campaign, which they carry out relentlessly, although 
an intense military onslaught by the Nigerian armed forces has managed to 
curtail part of  it.20 Both the insurgents and the security forces are engaged in a 
bitter media war. They both use traditional media, the Internet, and social media 
15 Abdullahi Tasiu Abubakar, ‘Communicating Violence: The Media Strategies of  Boko Haram’, in M. Bunce, 
S.Franks and C. Paterson (eds), Africa’s Media Image in the 21st Century: From The ‘Heart of  Darkness’ to ‘Africa Rising 
(Oxford: Routledge, 2016, pp. 200–210); Robyn Kriel, ‘TV, Twitter, and Telegram: Al-Shabaab’s Attempts to 
Influence Mass Media’, Defence Strategic Communications, 4(Spring), 2018, 11–48; James Farwell, ‘The Media Strat-
egy of  ISIS’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 56(6), (2014), 49–55; Marc Lynch, ‘Al-Qaeda’s Media Strategies’, 
National Interest 83, (2006): 50–56.
16 Rafal Zgryziewicz, Violent Extremism and Communications (Riga: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of  
Excellence, 2018).  
17 Alexander Thurston, Boko Haram: The History of  an African Jihadist Movement (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2017); Abubakar, ‘Communicating Violence’; Smith, Mike, Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria’s Unholy War (Lon-
don: I.B. Tauris, 2015).
18 Umaru Pate and Hamza Idris, ‘How Journalists Survived to Report: Professionalism and Risk Management in 
the Reporting of  Terror Groups and Violent Extremism in North East Nigeria’, in U. Carlsson and R. Poyhtari 
(eds.), The Assault on Journalism: Building Knowledge to Protect Freedom of  Expression (Goteborg: Nordicom, University 
of  Gothenburg, 2017, pp. 159–71); United Nations, ‘Security Council Briefing on the Situation in the Lake Chad 
Basin, Under-Secretary-General Jeffrey Feltman’, 13 September 2017. [Accessed 12 October 2017]. 
19 Abdullahi Tasiu Abubakar, ‘Strategic Communications, Boko Haram and Counter-insurgency’, Defence Strategic 
Communications 3(Autumn), (2017): p. 147.
20 Abubakar, ‘Communicating Violence’.
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platforms to advance their causes.21 They both court and repel journalists as part 
of  their communication strategies.22
This article investigates the relationship between these strategic communicators 
and journalists. It uses the case of  the media coverage of  the conflict to examine 
the nature of  the relationship. It sheds light on how journalists relate with both 
Boko Haram and security agencies’ strategic communicators, and how this im-
pacts their work. It also attempts to provide insights into how the strategic com-
municators themselves interact with journalists, and how they use their control 
of  information flow and access to conflict zones as leverage in their interactions. 
While scholarship has dealt extensively with the relationship between journalists 
and public relations practitioners (many PR specialists work as strategic com-
municators),23 it dwells mainly on their engagement in covering the affairs of  
corporations, governments, and non-profit organisations.24 Empirical studies in 
the field point to a relationship that is marked by cooperation and negotiation,25 
but also by conflict, mutual suspicion, and divergent perceptions.26 However, 
despite the high number of  such studies—over 200 from the 1960s to 2017, ac-
cording to Thomas Koch and his colleagues27—there is still no ‘coherent picture 
of  this complex interaction’.28 Specifically, insufficient attention has been given 
to journalists’ interface with strategic communicators regarding the reporting of  
violent extremism. This study attempts to fill this gap. Primary data were ob-
tained from individual interviews, focus groups, and content analysis. The theo-
21 Ibid.
22 Abubakar, ‘Strategic Communications’.
23 Kirk Hallahan, Derina Holtzhausen, Betteke van Ruler, Dejan Verčič and Krishnamurthy Sriramesh, ‘Defining 
Strategic Communication’, International Journal of  Strategic Communication 1(1), (2007): 3–35.
24 There is vast literature on this. For details see Thomas Koch, Magdalena Obermaier and Claudia Riesmey-
er, ‘Powered by Public Relations? Mutual Perceptions of  PR Practitioners’ Bases of  Power over Journalism’, 
Journalism, (2017): 1–17; Hallahan, ‘Defining Strategic Communication’; Justin Lewis, Andrew Williams and Bob 
Franklin, ‘A Compromised Fourth Estate? UK News Journalism, Public Relations and News Sources’, Journalism 
Studies 9(1), (2008): 1–20; Meron Medzini, ‘The Constants and Variables in Israel’s Information Strategies: Mem-
ories of  a Practitioner’, Journal of  Applied Journalism and Media Studies, 1(1), (2012): 115–21; Oscar Gandy, Beyond 
Agenda Setting: Information Subsidies and Public Policy (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex, 1982).
25 Ansgar Zerfass, Dejan Verčič and Markus Wiesenberg, ‘The Dawn of  a New Golden Age for Media Rela-
tions? How PR Professionals Interact with the Mass Media and Use New Collaboration Practices’, Public Relations 
Review 42(4), (2016) 499–508; Ana Verčič and Violeta Colić, ‘Journalists and Public Relations Specialists: A 
Coorientational Analysis’, Public Relations Review 42, (2016): 522–29; Richard Walters, Natalie Tindall and Timothy 
Morton, ‘Media Catching and the Journalist-Public Relations Practitioner Relationship: How Social Media are 
Changing the Practice of  Media Relations’, Journal of  Public Relations Research, 22(3), (2010): 241–64. 
26 Jim Macnamara, Journalism and PR: Unpacking ‘Spin’, Stereotypes & Media Myths (New York: Peter Lang, 2014); 
Koch, ‘Powered by Public Relations?’; Jean Charron, ‘Relations between Journalists and Public Relations Practi-
tioners: Cooperation, Conflict and Negotiation’, Canadian Journal of  Communication, 14(2) (1989): 41–54. 
27 Koch, ‘Powered by Public Relations?’, p. 3. 
28 Ibid. 
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retical framework was drawn from gatekeeping theory,29 which helps explain the 
relationship between strategic communicators and journalists. But the study also 
draws from news values theory to understand journalists’ interest in covering 
violent extremism,30 and from agenda-setting theory to help comprehend why 
strategic communicators crave relationships with the news media.31 It utilises 
strategic communications literature both from the military/security perspective 
(which this study focuses on) and from a public relations research perspective, 
where the term ‘strategic communications’ is increasingly being used as many 
PR professionals tend to see themselves—and often work—as strategic com-
municators.32
Strategic communications 
As a subject of  scholarly inquiry, strategic communications—originally singular 
but now mostly plural—is a relatively ‘new academic field’.33 But as a human 
practice, the art of  strategic communications could be traced back to the fourth 
century BC when the famous Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu declared that 
‘to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme 
excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting’.34 This 
suggests that strategic communications has a military origin but has been appro-
priated by a variety of  other disciplines. Peter Pomerantsev argues that strategic 
communications is a contested term, ‘derided by some as a more palatable sub-
stitute for “propaganda”, dismissed by others as glamorised public relations’.35 
A comprehensive definition—which this article draws from—was provided by 
Steve Tatham. He defines it as a ‘systematic series of  sustained and coherent 
activities, conducted across strategic, operational and tactical levels, that enables 
understanding of  target audiences, identifies effective conduits, and develops 
29 Pamela Shoemaker and Timothy Vos, Gatekeeping Theory (New York: Routledge, 2009); Jane Singer, ‘User-gen-
erated Visibility: Secondary Gatekeeping in a Shared Media Space’, New Media & Society 16(1), (2014): 55–73; Pe-
ter Bro and Filip Wallberg, Gatekeeping in a Digital Era, Journalism Practice 9(1), (2015): 92–105; David Manning 
White, ‘The “Gate Keeper”: A Case Study in the Selection of  News’, Journalism Quarterly 27(4), (1950): 383–90; 
Kurt Lewin, ‘Frontiers in Group Dynamics II: Channels of  Group Life; Social Planning and Action Research’, 
Human Relations 1, (1947): 143–53.
30 Tony Harcup and Deirdre O’Neill, ‘What is News? News Values Revisited (Again)’, Journalism Studies 18(12), 
(2017): 1470–88; Johan Galtung and Mari Ruge, ‘The Structure of  Foreign News: The Presentation of  the Con-
go, Cuba and Cyprus Crises in Four Norwegian Newspapers’, Journal of Peace Research 2(1), (1965): 64–91.
31 Maxwell McCombs, ‘A Look of  Agenda-setting: Past, Present and Future’, Journalism Studies 6(4), (2005): 
543–57. 
32 Hallahan, ‘Defining Strategic Communication’.
33 Ibid., p. 4.
34 Sun Tzu, The Art of  War (Translated by Lionel Giles and originally published in 1910) (Chapter 3, verse 2), 
[accessed 17 June 2016].
35 Peter Pomerantsev, Introduction to Information at War: From China’s Three Warfares to NATO’s Narratives by 
Transition Forums (London: Legatum Institute, 2015), p. 4.
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and promotes ideas and opinions through those conduits to promote and sus-
tain particular types of  behaviour’.36 It puts strategic communications back to 
its military origin and is flexible enough to contain different forms of  strategic 
communications campaigns—waged either by the military or by militants—and 
to accommodate a range of  people as strategic communicators, be they govern-
ment spin doctors, military spokespersons, or violent insurgents. 
For many, strategic communications is an essential part of  governance and a 
key ‘component of  national strategy’.37 James Farwell sees it from a political and 
national security angle, and maintains that its goal is to influence the attitudes of  
target audiences.38 Paul Cornish, Julian Lindley-French, and Claire Yorke identi-
fy four key components of  strategic communications: information operations, 
psychological operations, public diplomacy, and public affairs.39 There are ele-
ments of  both closeness and divergence among these components. While pub-
lic diplomacy primarily focuses on a government’s communicating with foreign 
publics to influence foreign governments,40 public affairs focuses mainly on in-
forming domestic audiences of  a government’s (and related agencies’) affairs.41 
However, Psychological Operations (PSYOP)—defined by the US military as 
‘[p]lanned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign 
audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ulti-
mately the behavior of  foreign governments, organizations, groups, and indi-
viduals’42—is seen as a component of  Information Operations (IO). The same 
military defines Information Operations as ‘the employment of  the core capa-
bilities of  electronic warfare, computer network operations, Psychological Op-
erations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified 
supporting and related capabilities, to affect or defend information and infor-
mation systems, and to influence decision-making’.43 Clearly, these components 
have common elements: ‘to inform, influence and persuade audiences at home 
36 Steve Tatham, Strategic Communications: A Primer, ARAG Special Series 8/28, Defence Academy of  the United 
Kingdom (2008), p. 3.
37 Paul Cornish, Julian Lindley-French and Claire Yorke, Strategic Communications and National Strategy (A Chatham 
House Report, The Royal Institute of  International Affairs, London: September 2011), p. v; Farwell, Persuasion 
and Power.
38 Farwell, Persuasion and Power.
39 Cornish, Strategic Communications and National Strategy.
40 For detail analysis on public diplomacy see Eytan Gilboa, ‘Searching for a Theory of  Public Diplomacy’, 
Annals of  the American Academy 616, (2008): 55–77. 
41 Farwell, Persuasion and Power.
42 Department of  the Army, Psychological Operations (Field Manual, 3-05.30: Washington, DC, 15 April 2005), 
Glossary-16.
43 Ibid., Chapter 7, p. 1.
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and abroad, whether friendly, adversarial or merely a member of  the public’.44 
And, as Farwell argues, this is what distinguishes strategic communications from 
other forms of  communication and makes it a vital tool for dealing with political 
and national security issues.45
The use of  strategic communications to pursue organisational missions is, how-
ever, not an exclusive preserve of  security services or governments; non-state 
actors, especially insurgent groups, have equally noted its relevance. Al-Qaeda,46 
ISIS,47 Boko Haram,48 and al-Shabaab49 have all employed strategic communica-
tions campaigns skilfully to advance their causes. Although they are all violent 
extremist groups with different approaches and techniques in pursuing their 
goals, they all seem to understand the significance of  communicating strate-
gically. Effective use of  new technologies and clarity of  narratives boost their 
campaigns.50 The level at which extremist groups were leveraging strategic com-
munications prompted some scholars to raise the alarm and suggest that the 
field was in crisis.51 Neville Bolt argued that the speed at which the terrain was 
changing under the contemporary ‘communications maelstrom’ made it difficult 
for states to cope well.52 ‘Speed, reach and iconic images have become a toxic 
brew for which states currently have no antidote.’53 New developments such 
as governments’ ability to employ cyber technology to detect the activities of  
extremist groups and to subvert terror attacks,54 however, suggest that states are 
now overcoming these hurdles, even though non-state actors are equally raising 
their game.
New technologies have widened the space for non-state and rough-state dis-
information operators, and disingenuous corporate bodies, to engage not only 
in disinformation campaigns but also in what Ghosh and Scott call ‘automat-
ed’ and ‘precision propaganda’, using various technologies including bots, data 
44 Cornish, Strategic Communications and National Strategy, p. 4.
45 Farwell, Persuasion and Power.
46 Lynch, ‘Al-Qaeda’s Media Strategies’. 
47 Farwell, ‘The Media Strategy of  ISIS’.   
48 Abubakar, ‘Communicating Violence’.
49 Kriel, ‘TV, Twitter, and Telegram’. 
50 David Betz and Vaughan Phillips, ‘Putting the Strategy Back into Strategic Communications’, Defence Strategic 
Communications 3(Autumn), (2017): 41–69; and Abubakar, ‘Communicating Violence’.
51 Neville Bolt, ‘Strategic Communications in Crisis’, The RUSI Journal 156(4), (2011): 44–53; and Betz, ‘Putting 
the Strategy Back into Strategic Communications’.
52 Bolt, ‘Strategic Communications in Crisis’, p. 54.
53 Ibid., p. 45.
54 Zgryziewicz, Violent Extremism and Communications.
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analytics, and audiences’ personal data.55 Reports of  the alleged use of  digital 
propaganda devices by Russia to influence the outcome of  the 2016 US election 
suggest that states, too, engage in such acts.56 New studies57 commissioned by 
the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence have found that Rus-
sian agents (through the state-supported Internet Research Agency) used many 
social media platforms—particularly Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Google+ 
and YouTube—in a bid to influence the 2016 US presidential election. ‘Russia’s 
Internet Research Agency (IRA) launched an extended attack on the United 
States by using computational propaganda to misinform and polarize US vot-
ers’, says one of  the reports.58 But even more significantly the activities were car-
ried out with industry-standard tools,59 suggesting that states have since turned 
the corner in digital strategic communications. States are also doing better in 
countering violent insurgents by exploiting the insurgents’ own digital strategic 
communications activity. Security services now use electronic warfare devices to 
impede the spread of  certain messages promoted by terror groups.60 They also 
monitor and infiltrate insurgents’ social media accounts to gain insight into their 
strengths and weaknesses, and to detect their activities with a view to countering 
them.61 All this suggests that the art of  strategic communications is enjoying a 
boom.62 But Monroe Price has warned that the massive investments in strategic 
communications by states, corporations, religious institutions, and non-govern-
mental organisations have elevated it to a status that is detrimental to the public 
good.63 ‘The growth of  strategic communications—heavily subsidized, usually 
transnational, engineered and often deceptive—can wreak havoc on traditional 
ideas of  community realization and self-determination.’64 He asserts that ‘in a 
media system pervaded by strategic communicators, persuasion, not truth, is 
often the most prized quality’.65 Journalism is meant to act as a check on this, but 
the profession is facing difficulties. 66 
55 Ireton, Journalism, Fake News & Disinformation; Ghosh, Digital Deceit; Bridge, ‘Tech Firms Have “Weaponised” 
Personal Data’.
56 Ibid.
57 Philip N. Howard, Bharath Ganesh, Dimitra Liotsiou, John Kelly and Camille Francois, The IRA, Social Media 
and Political Polarization in the United States, 2012–2018 (Working Paper 2018.2. Oxford UK: Project on Compu-
tational Propaganda); Renee DiResta, Kris Shaffer, Becky Ruppel, David Sullivan, Robert Matney, Ryan Fox, 
Jonathan Albright, and Ben Johnson, The Tactics & Tropes of  the Internet Research Agency (A report by Knowledge, 
commissioned by the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC, released on 17 
December 2018), [accessed 18 December 2018].
58 Howard, The IRA, p.3.
59 Ibid.; Ghosh, Digital Deceit.
60 Zgryziewicz, Violent Extremism and Communications.
61 Ibid.
62 Ghosh, Digital Deceit.
63 Price, Free Expression, Globalism and New Strategic Communication.
64 Ibid., p. 7.
65 Ibid., p. 22.
66 Russial, ‘Journalism in Crisis?’; McChesney, ‘Farewell to Journalism?’.
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Journalism and public relations
Described as essentially ‘the business or practice of  producing and disseminat-
ing information about contemporary affairs of  general public interest and im-
portance’,67 journalism is currently ‘transitioning from a more or less coherent 
industry to a highly varied and diverse range of  practices’.68 To underscore the 
diversified nature of  the profession, Barbie Zelizer identifies twelve metaphors 
for understanding journalism.69 Seven of  those metaphors, she states, are provid-
ed by journalists themselves—a sixth sense, container, mirror, story, child (news 
seen as a child requiring nurturing), service, and engagement. The remaining 
five, she notes, come from journalism scholars—a profession, institution, text, 
people, and practice.70 Whatever transformation it is undergoing, journalism is 
generally seen as a profession whose remit has gone beyond the realm of  news 
reporting.71 It is often linked with democracy and freedom. Michael Schudson,72 
for instance, has highlighted the role of  journalism in sustaining and extending 
democracy. And there are numerous accounts of  journalists making sacrifices to 
defend democratic values.73  
But journalism is also considered from other perspectives ‘as a form of  social 
control rather than the means of  political emancipation’.74 This view aligns with 
Antonio Gramsci’s broad conception of  the media as an ideological apparatus 
of  the state.75 Here journalism is seen as an instrument used by the dominant 
class to extend their power and retain privileges. But an even more critical de-
scription of  the profession was presented a century ago by Upton Sinclair, him-
self  a journalist. He defines American journalism ‘as the business and practice of  
presenting the news of  the day in the interest of  economic privilege’.76 Sinclair 
did not really have disdain for his colleagues, the majority of  whom he describes 
as decent people merely carrying out orders from their greedy employers, but he 
had contempt for the way the profession was being practiced. ‘Journalism,’ he 
says, ‘is one of  the devices whereby industrial autocracy keeps its control over 
67 Michael Schudson, The Sociology of  News (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003), p. 11.
68 Deuze, ‘Beyond Journalism’, p. 166.
69 Zelizer, What Journalism Could Be.
70 Ibid.
71 McChesney, ‘Farewell to Journalism?’.
72 Michael Schudson, Why Democracies Need an Unlovable Press (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008). 
73 Ulla Carlsson and Reeta Pöyhtäri (eds), The Assault on Journalism: Building Knowledge to Protect Freedom of  Expres-
sion (Goteborg: Nordicom, University of  Gothenburg, 2017).
74 Martin Conboy, Journalism Studies: The Basics (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 52.
75 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey 
Nowell Smith, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971).
76 Upton Sinclair, The Brass Check: A Study of  American Journalism (1st Ed., California: Pasadena, 1919), p. 222.
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political democracy; it is the day-by-day, between-elections propaganda’.77 
Many of  the issues Sinclair raised have since been addressed with the develop-
ment of  journalism ethics. And the profession is seen by many as ‘a watchdog 
operating on behalf  of  the public’ whose contributions to societal wellbeing and 
progress earn it the name ‘Fourth Estate of  the realm’.78 Brian McNair’s Jour-
nalism and Democracy, which uses the specific case of  British society, highlights 
journalism’s role in expanding democratic possibilities and checking the excesses 
of  the powerful.79 The ongoing struggle by journalists to hold the leader of  the 
world’s most powerful nation, US President Donald Trump, to account, and his 
continuing reference to their stories as ‘fake news’ is an illustration of  this.80 As 
a means of  public expression and a link between the government and the gov-
erned, Denis McQuail argues, journalism plays an essential part in the collective 
life of  a society.81 
Despite this societal role, though, the journalism industry is facing hard times: 
falling revenues, closure of  news outlets, continuing job losses, and fierce com-
petition from tech giants.82 New technologies, economic changes, and the rise of  
the public relations industry are some of  the factors blamed for this. But many 
journalism scholars and practitioners do not regard new technology as a threat 
to the profession; they see it as a vital tool of  transforming it.83 Financial Times 
editor Lionel Barber argues that journalism benefits from new technologies, as 
digital revolution has ‘led to an explosion of  creativity and new forms of  rich 
storytelling’. What is problematic to journalism, he asserts, is ‘the growing pow-
er of  the public relations industry’, which uses its muscles to muzzle the press.84 
‘The army of  public relations advisers employed by individuals and companies 
with thin skins and deep pockets’, and the ‘rising power of  private markets ver-
sus public markets’ make ‘it far harder for journalists to access information’.85 
77 Ibid.
78 Conboy, Journalism Studies, p. 72.
79 McNair, Brian, Journalism and Democracy: An Evaluation of  the Political Public Sphere (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2000).
80 BBC, ‘White House suspends credentials for CNN’s Jim Acosta’, BBC Online (8 November 2018). [accessed 
8 November 2018]. 
81 Denis McQuail, Journalism and Society (London and Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2013).
82 Ireton, Journalism, Fake News & Disinformation; Russial, ‘Journalism in Crisis?’; McChesney, ‘Farewell to Journal-
ism?; Almiron, Journalism in Crisis.
83 Deuze, ‘Beyond Journalism’; Lionel Barber, ‘Too Big to Fail: The Future of  Financial Journalism’, Paper 
presented at James Cameron Memorial Lecture (City, University of  London, 22 November 2018).
84 Barber, ‘Too Big to Fail’.
85 Ibid.
62
Defence Strategic Communications | Volume 5 | Autumn 2018
DOI 10.30966/2018.RIGA.5.2.
His argument indicates the complex relationship between journalism and public 
relations, a term some equate with strategic communications. But although 
public relations is closely related to strategic communications, as both focus 
on communicating to influence audiences, the two terms are not synonymous. 
As seen in the definition provided by Tatham and adopted by this article,86 
strategic communications is a much more encompassing concept, with public 
relations being just one of  its main components.87 Public relations has been 
subjected to varied definitions, but Lee Edwards provides an apt description 
that gives it a broad perspective.88  She defines it as ‘the flow of  purposive 
communication produced on behalf  of  individuals, formally constituted and 
informally constituted groups, through their continuous transactions with other 
social entities’.89
Given this remit of  establishing and sustaining continuous interactions with 
other entities, public relations is constantly engaged with—and even encroaches 
on—journalism, as practices such as commissioning brand journalism to 
promote marketing campaigns and embedding journalists with military units 
during armed conflicts continue to grow.90 The way many journalists are also 
relying on information subsidies91 from public relations professionals in their 
work highlights the interdependent nature of  their relationship. Defined as ‘the 
efforts of  news sources to intentionally shape the news agenda by reducing 
journalists’ costs of  gathering information’,92 information subsidies, which 
mainly come in the form of  press releases, have been identified as an effective 
tool used by public relations professionals to secure favourable media coverage 
for their clients.93 They use it effectively to enhance the growth of  their 
profession.
The PR industry is indeed expanding rapidly while journalism is contracting. The 
situation in the United States illustrates this vividly. According to the US Bureau 
of  Labor Statistics, the number of  journalists in the United States in 2016 was 
86 Tatham, Strategic Communications.
87 Cornish, Strategic Communications and National Strategy; Hallahan, ‘Defining Strategic Communication’.
88 Ralph Tench and Liz Yeomans, Exploring Public Relations (3rd ed., Harlow, UK: Pearson, 2014).
89 Lee Edwards, Defining the Object of  Public Relations: A New Starting Point’, Public Relations Inquiry 1(1), 
(2012): 1–24, p. 15.
90 There have been discussions about the blurring of  lines between public relations and journalism, details of  
which is contained in Macnamara, Journalism and PR.
91 These are mainly news releases by organisations and there are many works on it. See Gandy, Beyond Agenda Set-
ting; Dan Berkowitz and Douglas Adams, ‘Information Subsidy and Agenda-Building in Local Television News’, 
Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly 67(4), (1990): 723–31.   
92 Berkowitz, ‘Information Subsidy’, p. 723.  
93 Berkowitz, ‘Information Subsidy’; Lewis, ‘A Compromised Fourth Estate?’.   
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50,400, which is projected to decline by 9% in the next decade.94 This is in contrast 
to what obtains in the public relations industry, whose practitioners numbered 
259,600 in the same year, and is projected to rise by 9% in the coming decade.95 
What is more, despite the swell in their number, PR specialists still earn much 
higher salaries than journalists. According to the Bureau’s figures, the median an-
nual pay for a PR specialist in 2017 is $59,300, compared to journalist’s $40,910 in 
the same year.96 However, Barber argues, it is not actually the increase in the num-
ber of  public relations professionals that is problematic—many of  them do offer 
valuable services to journalism and to other spheres of  human endeavours—it 
is the ‘Black PR’ (using PR for smear campaigns) that is the source of  concern.97 
‘Black PR—sometimes pushed by ex-spooks—[…] uses social media platforms to 
attack and undermine reputations and independent journalism’, he notes.98 Similar 
concerns have equally been raised about violent extremists using social media and 
even traditional media platforms to pursue their objectives, as will be seen later in 
the case of  Boko Haram’s use of  media in Nigeria. 
Gatekeeping 
As a country, Nigeria has a reputation for sustaining a robust journalism indus-
try, among the freest in Africa, with its media landscape described as ‘vibrant 
and varied’.99 The print and online media are independent and effectively con-
trolled by the private sector, while the broadcast sector is largely dominated by 
the state but with an increasing presence of  private ownership.100 Journalists, 
especially those working in the print and online media, generally have strong 
editorial independence, exercising judgement on what stories to publish and 
what to ignore. But government, corporate, and non-profit bodies also exert 
influence on what the media publish,101 using patronage, placement of  adver-
tisements, and information subsidies. This is the area where the issue of  gate-
keeping becomes relevant. 
94 US Bureau of  Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook, Reporters, Correspondents, and Broadcast 
News Analysts, 13 April 2018. [accessed 23 November 2018].
95 US Bureau of  Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook, Public Relations Specialists, 2 July 2018. [ac-
cessed 23 November 2018].
96 Ibid.; US Bureau of  Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook, Reporters, Correspondents, and Broadcast 
News Analysts.
97 Barber, ‘Too Big to Fail’.
98 Ibid.
99 Freedom House, ‘Freedom of  the Press 2017—Nigeria’, Freedom House (15 May 2017). [accessed 19 
December 2017].
100 Ibid.
101 For detail on this see Yusha’u, Muhammad, ‘Investigative Journalism and Scandal Reporting in the Nigerian 
press’,ECQUID NOVI 30(2), (2009): 155–74. 
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Gatekeeping theory originated from the work of  German-American social psy-
chologist Kurt Lewin in his analysis of  housewives’ gatekeeping role ‘in deter-
mining food habits’—with his brief  mention of  the existence of  a similar pro-
cess in news production.102 But it was David Manning White who pioneered the 
application of  the theory in mass communication research with his seminal ‘Gate 
Keeper’ study in 1950.103 The original idea of  gatekeeping, though, is traceable 
to the work of  American journalist and intellectual Walter Lippmann—although 
he did not specifically use that term. His Public Opinion,104 which is equally cred-
ited with providing the foundations of  the framing and agenda-setting theories, 
makes clear references to an editor’s role in the rigorous process of  rejection and 
selection of  materials in news production. ‘Without standardization, without 
stereotypes, without routine judgments, without a fairly ruthless disregard of  
subtlety, the editor would soon die of  excitement’, he writes.105
Every newspaper when it reaches the reader is the result of  a 
whole series of  selections as to what items shall be printed, in 
what position they shall be printed, how much space each shall 
occupy, and what emphasis each shall have.106
So, the idea of  gatekeeping has been around for nearly a century, but it was 
White’s research on how a wire editor he named ‘Mr Gates’ performed a gate-
keeping role to determine the content of  his newspaper that gave us an insight 
into the application of  the theory—at least as obtained in early 20th century 
American journalism. The theory has since been developed by many commu-
nication scholars to fit into the fast-changing nature of  the 21st century media 
landscape.107 An outstanding contribution comes from Pamela Shoemaker and 
Timothy Vos who describe gatekeeping as ‘the process of  culling and crafting 
countless bits of  information into the limited number of  messages that reach 
people each day’.108 They highlight its centrality in the role of  the media in public 
life. Gatekeeping ‘determines not only which information is selected, but also 
what the content and nature of  messages, such as news, will be’.109 
102 See, in particular, Lewin, ‘Frontiers in Group Dynamics II’, p. 143. The first volume of  the work is Lewin, 
Kurt, ‘Frontiers in Group Dynamics I: Concept, Method and Reality in Social Science; Social Equilibria’, Human 
Relations 1, (1947a): 5–40.
103 White, ‘The “Gate Keeper”’.
104 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Macmillan, 1922).
105 Ibid., p. 352.
106 Ibid., p. 354.
107 Shoemaker, Gatekeeping Theory; Singer, ‘User-generated Visibility’; Bro, ‘Gatekeeping in a Digital Era’.
108 Shoemaker, Gatekeeping Theory, p. 1.
109 Ibid.
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Jane Singer focuses on digital era journalism where she identifies ‘a two-step 
gatekeeping process’ in which users act as secondary gatekeepers.110 ‘Users 
are choosing news not only for their own consumption but also for the con-
sumption of  others’.111 Peter Bro and Filip Wallberg dwell on the changes ‘new 
technologies and new ideologies’ have brought to gatekeeping practices, with 
audiences becoming more empowered.112 They reinforce Shoemaker and Vos’s 
earlier proposition about the audience-empowering role played by the Internet. 
‘Compared to other mass media, the internet provides much more opportunity 
for an audience member to interact with news makers, news creators, and each 
other. This high level of  interactivity turns audience members into gatekeep-
ers.’113 It is the ability to highlight the relevance of  gatekeepers in the changing 
media environment and its close relationship with the theories of  agenda-set-
ting and news value that affirm the applicability of  gatekeeping theory in this 
research. It is gatekeeping—whether practiced by journalists, strategic commu-
nicators, or violent extremists—that determine which content (be it from in-
surgents or from counter-insurgents) reaches the audience and which doesn’t 
(more on this later).
Violent extremism and news values
Often equated with terrorism, the term violent extremism is increasingly being 
used in reference to identity-related violence. Rafal Zgryziewicz says it ‘includes 
all actions in which identity-motivated violence, from hate crimes to genocide, 
are used as tools to achieve desired objectives’.114 In this article violent extrem-
ism is seen as a process of  deliberate and illegitimate use of  violence, including 
terrorist attacks, in pursuit of  ideological, political, religious, or racial goals. It 
can be used to describe the actions of  violent extremist groups such as ISIS and 
Boko Haram or the violence perpetrated by racist and right-wing extremists. As 
the United Nations Development Programme notes, violent extremism ‘is nei-
ther new nor exclusive to any region, nationality or system of  belief ’.115
Boko Haram has engaged in violent extremism since 2009, causing indescrib-
able suffering and devastation in Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.116 Rough 
110 Singer, ‘User-generated Visibility’, p. 55.
111 Ibid., p. 68.
112 Bro, ‘Gatekeeping in a Digital Era’, p. 93.
113 Shoemaker, Gatekeeping Theory, p. 6.
114 Zgryziewicz, Violent Extremism and Communications.
115 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and the 
Tipping Point for Recruitment (New York: UNDP, 2017), p. 19.
116 Thurston, Boko Haram; Abubakar, ‘Communicating Violence’; Smith, Boko Haram.
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estimates of  the impact of  their insurgency range from 30,000 to 40,000 lives 
lost; and also include three million displaced, $9 billion in economic losses in 
Nigeria’s northeast alone, and about 11 million people in need of  humanitarian 
assistance.117 At one time (between mid-2014 to early 2015) the insurgents con-
trolled an area estimated to be the size of  Belgium, but the military has since 
retaken most of  it, with only a part of  the Sambisa Forest and the Lake Chad 
basin (the size of  which has never been disclosed to the public) still believed 
to be under their control. Boko Haram militants derive their power primarily 
through armed violence, but they also use media ‘to spread their ideology, ex-
tend their brutality, intimidate their enemies and recruit new adherents’.118 They 
recognised the centrality of  media in advancing their cause right from their early 
days, and set up a unit for it known as the ‘Public Awareness Department’, head-
ed by their spokesmen with direct guidance from the group’s supreme leader 
Abubakar Shekau.119 Their strategy is based on the assumption that violence 
generates hard power and media attention.120 They saw this in the case of  their 
abductions of  the 276 Chibok schoolgirls in 2014, which put them in the global 
spotlight, and which they used to secure the release of  some of  their com-
manders while gaining concessions from the government. This was followed by 
new rounds of  kidnappings, killings, and negotiations—all of  which continue 
to generate media coverage.121
The recognition of  the agenda-setting function of  the media has its basis in 
journalism scholarship,122 and strategic communicators have never lost sight of  
this. Described as ‘the transfer of  salience from the media agenda to the public 
agenda’,123 agenda-setting theory helps explain how some state and non-state 
actors crave publicity, and why they devote considerable energy and resources 
to use, control or manipulate the news media. The way Boko Haram insurgents 
employed the media to pursue their objectives has been well explained in works 
that highlight their communications strategies.124 But it is the newsworthiness of  
some of  their actions that also helps generate the media attention they get, and 
117 Pate, ‘How Journalists Survived to Report’; United Nations, ‘Security Council Briefing on the Situation in the 
Lake Chad Basin’; Abubakar, ‘Strategic Communications’.
118 Abubakar, ‘Strategic Communications’, p. 148.
119 Initially it was the group’s founder Muhammad Yusuf, but after his death Shekau became the supreme 
leader; and when the group split into two, Shekau led his own faction while Abu Mus’ab al-Barnawi (Muham-
mad Yusuf ’s son) led the other faction. See Abubakar, ‘Strategic Communications’; Abubakar, ‘Communicating 
Violence’.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid.; Abubakar, ‘Strategic Communications’.
122 McCombs, ‘A Look of  Agenda-setting’; and Lippmann, Public Opinion.
123  McCombs, ‘A Look of  Agenda-setting’, p. 543.
124 Abubakar, ‘Communicating Violence’; Abubakar, ‘Strategic Communications’.
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this can be explained through the lens of  another theory. News values theory 
has detailed numerous criteria that make events newsworthy,125 and previous 
studies have shown that many actions of  the Boko Haram insurgents do meet 
many of  those criteria.126 ‘Whether it was the kidnapping of  schoolgirls, the 
bombing of  markets, or the beheading of  innocent civilians, each major action 
carried out by Boko Haram militants has intense negative consequences and is 
therefore deemed newsworthy.’127 This and the militants’ media savviness en-
hance the media presence of  the group. 
The Nigerian security forces, too, receive media coverage in their campaign to 
dislodge the insurgents, partly on account of  the newsworthiness of  their op-
erations and partly due to their own media output.128 Each of  the forces in-
volved in the campaign—the Nigerian Army, the Nigerian Air Force, and the 
Nigeria Police Force—has its own formal communications structure, which it 
uses for its day-to-day media activity. These structures are used in the strategic 
communications campaign with additional resources such as employment of  
public relations consultants and coordination of  the various units to work as 
a team. This led to the formation of  the Forum of  Spokespersons of  Security 
and Response Agencies (FOSSRA), comprising representatives of  the military, 
paramilitary, intelligence, and response agencies, to help in the long-running 
campaign129—though FOSSRA ceased operations in 2015. The Directorate of  
Defence Information in Abuja or the Directorate of  Army Public Relations 
in Abuja, often headed by a General, leads the overall strategic communica-
tions campaign, with various army public relations units in different parts of  
the country assisting. The police have a similar structure, with the main Force 
Public Relations Officer based at police headquarters in Abuja and state com-
mands having their own public relations officers. They all interact with journal-
ists, though the army retains overall control over matters related to countering 
the Boko Haram insurgency.
125 Galtung, ‘The Structure of  Foreign News’; Paul Brighton and Dennis Foy, News Values (London: Sage, 
2007); Harcup, ‘What is News?’.
126 Abubakar, ‘Strategic Communications’; Abubakar, ‘Communicating Violence’.
127 Abubakar, ‘Strategic Communications’, p. 162.
128 Abubakar, ‘Strategic Communications’.
129 Yushau Shuaib, Boko Haram Media War: An Encounter with the Spymaster, (Abuja: Image Merchants Promo-
tions, 2017), p. 275.
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Methodology
This study specifically examines the relationship between journalists and stra-
tegic communicators with reference to the coverage of  the Boko Haram con-
flict. The primary data were drawn from focus groups and individual interviews 
with thirty-two journalists and strategic communicators in Nigeria as well as 
analysis of  Boko Haram videos and press releases from the Nigerian security 
forces. Thirty-three press releases from both the police and army public re-
lations units—fifteen of  them downloaded directly from the army’s website 
(www.army.mil.ng), the rest, hard copies sourced from police and army public 
relations officers and journalists—and ten Boko Haram videos (obtained from 
online sources and journalists) were studied. Following Klaus Krippendorff ’s 
guidance,130 a qualitative content analysis method aimed at identifying the nature 
and meanings of  the messages contained in the press releases and videos was 
used to analyse them. This was primarily to complement and provide context 
to the data obtained from the main methods used for the study: individual in-
terviews and focus groups. Purposeful sampling technique was used to select all 
the participants: only journalists who have covered the Boko Haram conflict and 
strategic communicators who have dealt with journalists during the crisis were 
interviewed for the study. Two focus groups—one in the north-eastern Nigerian 
city of  Yola containing six journalists (named the Yola Group for easy identifi-
cation in the analysis) and the other in the capital Abuja (the Abuja Group), also 
with six journalists—were conducted in August and September 2017. Individual 
interviews were conducted with fourteen journalists in both Yola and Abuja in 
the months of  July and August 2017, as well as in August and September 2018. 
The journalists comprise two editors (one from a national newspaper and the 
other from a television station in north-eastern Nigeria), five correspondents 
of  national newspapers (Daily Trust, Guardian, Peoples Daily, ThisDay, and Punch) 
who have worked in the northeast, two defence correspondents, two television 
reporters, and three freelance journalists working for both Nigerian and for-
eign news media outlets. Six strategic communicators—four of  them are still 
serving in the Nigeria Police Force and the Nigerian Army while the remaining 
two have retired but still offer public relations consultancies—were interviewed 
during the same period (July–August 2017 and August–September 2018). They 
are all security forces’ public relations specialists who have worked as part of  the 
overall strategic communications campaign and are therefore regarded here as 
130 Klaus Krippendorff, Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology (2nd ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2004).
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strategic communicators. There were no interviews with Boko Haram strategic 
communicators, as the researcher did not have access to them (they are operat-
ing underground as their group has long been banned), but the content of  their 
videos and the interviews with journalists who had interacted with them provide 
insight into their work. All the participants were guaranteed anonymity both to 
help elicit candid responses from them and to abide by the research code of  
confidentiality. Richard Krueger’s framework of  analysis was used to analyse the 
focus groups,131 while Matthew Miles and Michael Huberman’s guidance was 
followed in analysing the individual interviews.132 The findings and discussions 
are presented under three broad themes below.  
A tense but interdependent relationship
Analysis of  the data reveals that journalists had tense but symbiotic relation-
ships with both security forces’ (army and police) public relations officers and 
Boko Haram spokesmen/operatives. There was clear recognition from the jour-
nalists that they needed sources to carry out their duty, and there was a desire 
from both the insurgents and the security personnel for their sides to be heard. 
This was what made the relationships mutually beneficial, and it was to become 
a key characteristic of  their engagement in the early days of  the insurgency. ‘Be-
fore they went underground, Boko Haram members talked to us openly. They 
organised press conferences, often to complain about police harassment or to 
tell us what the objectives of  their group were, and we attended them (the press 
conferences),’ said a national newspaper journalist who covered the insurgency 
for nearly a decade.133 ‘We would also speak to police, and later the army, to hear 
their own sides and balance our stories. We talked to all sides to do our job. They 
equally needed us to tell their stories.’ Another journalist who works both for a 
Nigerian news outlet and an international news agency gave a similar account 
but added: ‘It was initially a cordial relationship, even though there was a sense 
of  tension, which kept increasing as the clashes between the police and Boko 
Haram escalated.’134 A former police public relations officer who had worked 
with journalists on the Boko Haram conflict for three years acknowledged a 
tension in the relationship.135 ‘There’s too much pestering from journalists’, he 
131 Richard Krueger, Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1994).
132 Matthew Miles and Michael Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook (2nd ed., London: 
Sage, 1994). 
133 Interviewed in Abuja on 1 August 2017.
134 Interviewed in Yola on 22 July 2017.
135 Interviewed on 11 August 2018.
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said. ‘They would always want to get details about the crisis, which is fine. But 
they focused on the negative part, not on what we’re doing to maintain peace’, 
he added. ‘At times I just wouldn’t answer calls from journalists because I knew 
they were going to seek reaction about Boko Haram’s ridiculous claims.’ A serv-
ing police spokesman who has four years’ experience of  dealing with the Boko 
Haram issue echoed the same points and said he preferred issuing press releases 
to using question-and-answer sessions.136 ‘I found it easier to just issue a press 
release stating what happened and what police did’, he said. Three samples of  
the releases he issued (shown to the researcher) were all about Boko Haram 
attacks: two in a market and one at a mosque. They mainly contain the times the 
attacks took place, how they were carried out, the casualty figures, and how the 
police responded to them. 
The use of  ‘information subsidies’ such as press releases by PR professionals 
to enhance engagement with journalists is well explored in public relations lit-
erature.137 And it seems here that the Nigerian security services also found it 
effective in their handling of  the Boko Haram crisis (more on this later). ‘This 
approach [issuing press releases] is better for us, and possibly for journalists as 
well, because it somehow reduces the pressure we constantly get from them’, the 
police spokesman said. ‘But even with this, it wasn’t really a positive experience 
relating with journalists on [the] Boko Haram issue. That was why I felt a big 
relief  when most of  this work was transferred to the military’. The police’s role 
was significantly reduced when the military took full control of  the counter-in-
surgency campaigns, including media relations work, following the escalation 
of  the insurgency from 2012 onward.138 The police are still part of  the count-
er-insurgency work and they continue to communicate with journalists regularly 
about the issue but at a much lower scale than between 2009–12. 
Around the same time, Boko Haram leaders and spokesmen were in regular 
contact with journalists. This took the form of  direct contact when they were 
organising press briefings and granting face-to-face interviews.139 It happened 
mostly prior to and during the group’s mass uprising and its suppression at the 
end of  July 2009, events that claimed the lives of  about 800 people including the 
group’s founder, Muhammad Yusuf, who was killed while in police custody.140 
136 Interviewed on 25 July 2017.
137 Gandy, Beyond Agenda Setting; Lewis, ‘A Compromised Fourth Estate?’; Macnamara, Journalism and PR.
138 Abubakar, ‘Strategic Communications’.
139 Abubakar, ‘Communicating Violence’.
140 Ibid.
71
Defence Strategic Communications | Volume 5 | Autumn 2018
DOI 10.30966/2018.RIGA.5.2.
‘The relationship with them at that period was not very difficult’, a reporter who 
was in contact with them at that time said.141 ‘We would cover their press brief-
ings and do our stories without any problem with them or the police. They’re 
not banned then. They did have clashes with police, but they’re not killing peo-
ple like they do now.’ This changed when the group went underground after the 
suppression of  the July 2009 uprising. They no longer had face-to-face contact 
with journalists but their spokesmen, using the pseudonyms Abul Qaqa or Abu 
Darda or Abu Zaid, would call journalists on mobile phones and organise a tele-
conference.142 ‘He would call us and deliver the group’s message, usually issuing 
denials of  police and army claims or explanation about the group’s activity’, said 
a correspondent of  a national newspaper who had participated in some of  the 
teleconferences.143 ‘It was going on well before security operatives dealt with 
them.’ Boko Haram terminated the teleconferencing technique after the security 
services detected and killed the spokesmen.144 ‘But before that they were main-
taining a good relationship with journalists, so to say, even though there was a 
degree of  mistrust between us’, the correspondent added.
The contradictory mix of  cooperation and distrust seen in these journalists’ 
engagements with spokesmen from both the security forces and Boko Haram 
is a well-known feature of  this kind of  relationship. Jim Macnamara145 and Jean 
Charron146 have highlighted this in their respective works, citing cases of  rela-
tionships between public relations practitioners and journalists. Charron argues 
that the two are ‘mutually dependent on one another, a situation which demands 
cooperation, while their divergent control interests cause distrust and opposi-
tion’.147 From the findings here, it seems that the level of  distrust in this case 
is even higher, as the subject matter itself—violent extremism—is a national 
security issue that demands a high degree of  sensitivity.
Cordiality, intimidation, and harassment
When the military took full control of  the communications strategy in 2012 
the dynamics of  the relationship between them and journalists and insurgents 
changed. Broadly, both the military personnel and Boko Haram insurgents 
141 Interviewed in Abuja on 31 August 2018
142 Abubakar, ‘Strategic Communications’.
143 Interviewed in Abuja on 30 August 2018
144 Ibid.
145 Macnamara, Journalism and PR.
146 Charron,‘Relations between Journalists and Public Relations Practitioners’.
147 Ibid., p. 43.
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would court and cajole journalists when they wanted their versions of  stories 
published, but they would also intimidate and harass them and their news outlets 
when unfavourable reports were published. ‘Once they are interested in seeing 
something published, they will look for us or send their statements to us. You 
will hear some nice words from them’, a defence correspondent who partici-
pated in the Abuja Group discussion said of  his experience in relating with the 
military over his Boko Haram reporting.148 Other members of  the group unan-
imously endorsed his view, citing instances when their colleagues were harassed 
or intimidated by the military on account of  their coverage of  the insurgency. 
One such instance was the army’s detention of  Aljazeera journalists (Nigerian 
citizens working for the broadcaster in the country) when they went to Maidu-
guri to report on the insurgency in 2015.149 
Journalists who participated in the Yola Group discussion150 spoke of  experi-
encing a relationship with the military that they said was a mixture of  cordiality, 
intimidation, and harassment. ‘They are unpredictable; they could be nice in 
one moment and antagonistic in another’, one television reporter said of  the 
army public relations officers. ‘It depends on what their superiors want. If  their 
commanders had interest in pushing a story, the army PRO [Public Relations 
Officer] would look for us; if  not, they would avoid us.’ Other members in the 
group agreed. ‘When they [the army] retook Mubi [a town in the north-eastern 
state of  Adamawa] from Boko Haram, they organised a big tour for us and 
treated us very well’, said one freelance reporter in the Yola Group discussion. 
‘When we were there, we saw the destruction, we got many stories. But after 
that, it was hard to get even a single-line comment from them on other stories.’ 
Another television reporter spoke of  how he was promised by the army to be 
allowed to cover their campaigns to retake another town from the insurgents 
only to be let down at the last minute. ‘Everything was set and I was ready to go. 
I called the army public relations officer. He said, okay, I should call him later. 
Lo and behold, he stopped taking my calls.’ 
However, an army public relations officer offered a possible explanation on 
what might have prompted this fundamental kind of  gatekeeping.151 He said the 
military tends to refrain from taking journalists to counter-terror operations due 
148 Conducted in Abuja on 14 September 2017.
149 The Guardian,‘Al-Jazeera Calls for Release of  Two Journalists Held in Nigeria’, The Guardian (31 March 2015), 
[accessed 4 April 2015]. 
150 Conducted in Yola on 19 August 2017.
151 Interviewed on 29 August 2018.
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to safety concerns. ‘We only take journalists to safe places, where their safety 
and the operations wouldn’t be compromised. I personally wouldn’t promise to 
take them to counter-terrorism operations’, he said. ‘And, frankly, I never have 
any conflict with any journalist. Yes, I do ignore their calls sometimes and even 
get irritated by them, but we generally work well.’ A former army spokesman 
also spoke of  having a cordial relationship with journalists, but admitted that 
there were ‘many instances’ when he had to ‘warn them against spreading Boko 
Haram lies’.152 There were ‘frictions’, he said, but most of  them were not be-
tween the ‘Army PR team and journalists but between journalists and soldiers 
on other duties’. One newspaper correspondent said he had had an unpleasant 
experience in one such encounter.153 ‘I was harassed and intimidated by soldiers 
when I went to Chibok to cover the return of  the kidnapped Chibok girls’, he 
said. ‘They [the soldiers] seized my camera and only returned it after a senior 
officer intervened. They were very hostile.’ A different hostile engagement was 
witnessed in June 2014 when armed soldiers seized and destroyed copies of  
several editions of  newspapers from about ten media houses in the country. 
According to a Freedom House report, the ‘soldiers impounded newspaper de-
livery vehicles, searched employees, blocked printing and distribution centers, 
and seized copies of  at least 10 newspapers’. The papers were the leading dailies 
in the country, the most prominent of  which were: The Guardian, Punch, Daily 
Trust, ThisDay, and Leadership. ‘A military spokesman described the measures as a 
“routine security action” to search for alleged contraband, but they were widely 
interpreted as reprisals for coverage of  the military’s faltering efforts against 
Boko Haram’, the Freedom House report adds.154
Boko Haram’s hostility towards journalists over perceived unfavourable report-
ing is even more severe. ‘Before his death, Abul Qaqa always complained about 
negative reports’, a former senior correspondent who is now a newspaper editor 
said.155 ‘One day he called and threatened me with death when my paper pub-
lished a story based on an army statement that they’d killed some Boko Haram 
commanders.’ Two freelance journalists said they too had received similar death 
threats from other Boko Haram operatives.156 They said they were so fright-
ened, they relocated their families to safer places because the insurgents have 
152 Interviewed in Abuja on 4 September 2017.
153 Interviewed in Yola on 25 July 2018.
154 Freedom House, ‘Freedom of  the Press 2015—Nigeria’, Freedom House (28 April 2015). [accessed 28 April 
2015].
155 Interviewed in Abuja on 29 August 2018.
156 Both interviewed in Abuja on 30 August 2018.
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a reputation for carrying out their threats. Indeed, the militants do not always 
issue empty threats to journalists: they had killed at least two in the past and 
attacked offices for many newspapers following perceived negative coverage.157 
A cameraman of  the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA), Zakariyya Isa, was 
murdered in October 2011 after he was accused of  providing ‘security officials 
with information about their activities’.158 And in January 2012 Enenche Akog-
wu, a correspondent from Nigeria’s Channels Television, was killed when the 
insurgents attacked a major police station in the city of  Kano. It was unclear 
whether they deliberately targeted him or whether he was caught in the crossfire, 
but they were responsible for his death. In April 2012 they bombed the offices 
of  the newspaper ThisDay in Kaduna and Abuja, killing an employee of  the 
company and three passers-by. ‘ThisDay Director, Eniola Bello said, “one of  the 
reasons Boko Haram gave to justify their attack on our Abuja office was that we 
were not giving their activities front page prominence. They wanted to create 
panic”.’159
Gatekeeping and avoidance strategies
It is not just threat and violence—or enticement and persuasion—that Boko 
Haram strategic communicators use in relating with journalists; they also em-
ploy gatekeeping and avoidance strategies. Even during the group’s early days, its 
leaders always kept effective control of  information flowing from the group to 
the public. This was strengthened as the power of  the group grew. ‘Most of  the 
important information we have about Boko Haram is actually the information 
they supply to us themselves,’ said one senior correspondent who has covered 
the insurgency for nearly a decade.160 ‘It’s a very secretive organisation. They re-
lease their information selectively and effectively, as seen in the way they handled 
the information about the Chibok girls: releasing it in bits when it suited their 
interests.’ The newspaper editor concurred.161 ‘They send their video and audio 
messages to those journalists they have confidence in and avoid those they dis-
like. The internet too helps them to reach the public directly’, he said. ‘And the 
public does pay attention to what they say because the information the military 
often releases about them is not always accurate.’ The insurgents tend to release 
their messages when they sense a public desire for them, such as at the peak of  
157 Pate,‘How Journalists Survived to Report’.
158 Ibid., p. 163.
159 Ibid., p.164.
160 Interviewed in Yola on 20 August 2017.
161 The editor interviewed on 29 August 2018 quoted earlier.
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the Chibok girls’ saga, or when the government makes claims about defeating 
them, or the army claims to have rescued kidnap victims from them, or when 
news about the purported killing of  their leader is spread. 
An analysis of  a sample of  ten Boko Haram videos released from April 2014 
to October 2018 shows that the group focused on each of  these issues at the 
time when each was attracting public attention, making their contents attractive 
to journalists. All the videos contain speeches of  Boko Haram leader Abubakar 
Shekau, with him talking to the camera as if  delivering his messages directly to 
the public. Another common feature of  the videos is the rebuttal of  claims by 
the government or security forces, which strengthens their appeal to journalists 
as a means of  balancing one-sided official claims. All the journalists interviewed 
admitted sourcing stories directly from Boko Haram video or audio messages. 
‘There is virtually no other way of  getting information from the group now’, 
said an editor from a television station.162 ‘Their videos contain newsworthy ma-
terial and they often have more accurate information than the stuff  we get from 
the government.’ So, clearly, a lack of  direct access to Boko Haram (and to the 
area it controls ) and the newsworthiness of  the material it dishes out compel 
journalists to rely on the insurgents’ information subsidies—highlighting the 
relevance of  both the concept of  information subsidies163 and that of  news 
values theory.164  
The security forces’ strategic communicators also use gatekeeping and avoid-
ance strategies in their relationship with the journalists. As noted earlier in com-
ments by army and police public relations officers, where they admitted ignoring 
journalists’ phone calls, strategic communicators employ avoidance tactics to 
block access to certain information, discourage the publication of  unfavourable 
stories, and reduce pressure from journalists. ‘We could not respond to every 
interview request; the best option was to issue press releases to reach every 
journalist at the same time’, said a senior army officer who had worked in their 
public relations department for many years.165 ‘It enabled us to control the in-
formation we’re releasing. With the availability of  the Internet and social media 
now, the army is reaching the public directly, without any hindrance.’ Journalists 
are aware of  this strategy and have apparently learnt to live with it. ‘The military 
strictly controls access to the conflict zone. Only they, Boko Haram and the 
162 Interviewed on 26 July 2017.
163 Gandy, Beyond Agenda Setting. 
164 Galtung,‘The Structure of  Foreign News’; Brighton, News Values; and Harcup,‘What is News?’.
165 Interviewed on 24 July 2017.
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victims trapped there know what is happening’, the editor from the television 
station said. ‘They control the flow of  information and we rely heavily on them. 
They hardly come to us these days, they just email press releases to us after up-
loading them on their website and social media.’ 
A national newspaper correspondent concurred, adding that the only time army 
spokespersons showed keenness in looking for journalists was when they were 
caught lying.166 ‘That’s when you will see them desperately looking for journal-
ists to publish their stories with claims of  how mistakes were made’, he said, 
citing instances when the army made false claims about rescuing kidnap victims 
or issued inaccurate casualty figures and then sought journalists’ assistance for 
damage limitation after public outrage. If  they were not looking for such help, 
he said, the military would just email press statements to journalists ‘sometimes 
directly, sometimes via PR Nigeria’ (a public relations firm employed by the mil-
itary). ‘And there is little we can do, other than to use them because we can’t go 
to the actual conflict zone to get the stories ourselves’, he added. 
The security forces’ use of  information subsidies in their media campaign 
against Boko Haram is extensive. From mid-2013 to mid-2015 alone they ‘issued 
over 3000 media contents including newsworthy items and publications’.167 The 
figure is much higher now (no updated statistics because the military no longer 
releases them) as the security forces have continued to produce and distribute 
such materials. These are mostly press statements providing information about 
the military’s ‘counter-insurgency operations’ and the ‘successes’ they recorded. 
Many of  them were also uploaded on the official websites and social media 
pages of  the Army and the Defence Headquarters. An analysis of  thirty of  
those releases show they are largely army promotional materials; but they con-
tain news elements attractive to journalists and are written as news stories. They 
include stories about troops disarming teenage suicide bombers, how the ‘Army 
neutralizes Boko Haram terrorists’, how ‘troops rescue hostages used as sex 
slaves’, how they ‘kill 15 Boko Haram insurgents’, how they retake towns once 
controlled by Boko Haram, and how they ‘recover arms’ and ‘restore normalcy’. 
The public relations firm PR Nigeria was involved in carrying out the ‘exten-
sive activities involving editorial works, event management, media production 
166 Interviewed in Abuja 14 September 2017.
167 This information is contained in Shuaib, Boko Haram Media War, p. 10, in a Foreword for the book by former 
National Security Adviser Retired Colonel Sambo Dasuki. The book details part of  the media relations work 
done by the military from mid-2013 to mid-2015.
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and placements in print, electronic and online media’ required by the military.168 
They often liaise with news organisations to help facilitate the publication of  
the press releases.169 It was partly due to the high volume of  media publications 
resulting from these releases that the military admitted that, despite difficulties 
encountered, some of  the media outlets have ‘played very strategic roles’ in their 
strategic communications campaigns.170
Public relations scholarship has highlighted the significance of  information sub-
sidies in image building and agenda setting in government affairs and in the cor-
porate world.171 It is clear that this also applies to security and military matters. 
What is more, the evidence in this study suggests that the use of  this strategy in 
reference to the issue of  violent extremism reaches beyond image building and 
agenda setting;172 it extends to the area of  gatekeeping.173 Mass communication 
scholars have identified layers of  gatekeeping from newsgathering through to 
news consumption, even in the current digital era: news sources, journalists, 
users, and audiences all play the role of  gatekeeper.174  And it is evident here that 
strategic communicators (both Boko Haram and security forces) have managed 
to turn themselves into major gatekeepers, regularly using the Internet and so-
cial media, and their control of  the conflict zone, to appropriate a significant 
part of  the journalists’ gatekeeping powers.  
Conclusion
The findings of  this study suggest that journalists have an increasingly com-
plicated but interdependent relationship with strategic communicators in con-
flict reporting. The relationship is characterised by cooperation, conflict, and 
confrontation—with journalists sometimes being subjected to harassment and 
intimidation. They rely heavily on strategic communicators for information be-
cause the level of  violence in the Boko Haram conflict prevents them from 
accessing the conflict zone. Unlike the reporting of  corporate and government 
affairs, which usually takes place in a peaceful environment, covering violent 
insurgency involves serious risk-taking (such as going to the scene of  violence), 
168 Shuaib, Boko Haram Media War, p. 15.
169 Shuaib, Boko Haram Media War.
170 Ibid., p. 9; Abubakar,‘Strategic Communications’.
171 Gandy, Beyond Agenda Setting; Charron, ‘Relations between Journalists and Public Relations Practitioners’; 
Lewis,‘A Compromised Fourth Estate?; Macnamara, Journalism and PR.
172 Lippmann, Public Opinion; and McCombs,‘A Look of  Agenda-setting’. 
173 White,‘The “Gate Keeper”’; Shoemaker, Gatekeeping Theory; Singer, ‘User-generated Visibility’; Bro, ‘Gate-
keeping in a Digital Era’. 
174 Ibid.
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which strategic communicators here exploit fully to the detriment of  journalists. 
Strategic communicators’ control of  the conflict theatre and use of  the Internet 
and social media enabled them to transform themselves into major gatekeepers. 
This control notwithstanding, the findings show that strategic communicators 
still court journalists to help enhance the reach and credibility of  their narra-
tives, suggesting that the more the public uncovers strategic communicators’ 
false claims, the stronger the influence of  journalists. Conversely, the more the 
gatekeeping role of  journalists diminishes, the greater the power of  strategic 
communicators becomes.
This research has provided some insight into the dynamic nature of  the rela-
tionship between journalism and strategic communications practitioners, shed-
ding light on how it is affected by new technologies, and how this impacts their 
works. However, the research throws up new questions: How much does strate-
gic communicators’ use of  information subsidies influence media coverage of  
the Boko Haram insurgency?  And to what extent has the media’s lack of  access 
to the actual conflict zones affected our understanding of  the crisis?  These are 
areas for future research. But importantly, this study does point to the continu-
ing relevance of  gatekeeping theory in mass communication research, even in 
the current radically changing media landscape. It also shows that its applicabil-
ity reaches beyond corporate and political communications to critical areas of  
security and military strategic communications. And even more significantly, this 
research highlights the power dynamics between journalists and strategic com-
municators in their gatekeeping roles in conflict reporting, indicating an appar-
ent shift of  power from the former to the latter. The power shift, however, does 
not end strategic communicators’ reliance on journalists in their bid to enhance 
the credibility of  their narratives—a testimony of  the value journalists have to 
them and a sign that their relationship may nevertheless survive.
Acknowledgements
Fieldwork was funded by a pump-priming grant from City, University of  Lon-
don. The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their insight-
ful comments. 
79
Defence Strategic Communications | Volume 5 | Autumn 2018
DOI 10.30966/2018.RIGA.5.2.
Bibliography
Abubakar, Abdullahi Tasiu, ‘Communicating Violence: The Media Strategies 
of  Boko Haram’, in M. Bunce, S.Franks and C. Paterson (eds), Africa’s Media 
Image in the 21st Century: From The ‘Heart of  Darkness’ to ‘Africa Rising’ (Oxford: 
Routledge, 2016, pp. 200–10).
_____, ‘Strategic Communications, Boko Haram and Counter-insurgency’, 
Defence Strategic Communications 3(Autumn), (2017): 139–69. 
Alexander, Jeffrey C., ‘The Crisis of  Journalism Reconsidered: Cultural Power’, 
Fudan Journal of  Humanities and Social Sciences 8(1), (2015): 9–31. 
Almiro, Núria, Journalism in Crisis: Corporate Media and Financialization (New 
York: Hampton Press, 2010). 
Ardèvol-Abreu, Alberto and Homero Gil de Zúñiga, ‘Effects of  Editorial 
Media Bias Perception and Media Trust on the Use of  Traditional, Citizen, and 
Social Media News’, Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly 94(3), (2017): 
703–24. 
Barber, Lionel, ‘Too Big to Fail: The Future of  Financial Journalism’, Paper 
presented at James Cameron Memorial Lecture (City, University of  London, 
22 November 2018).
BBC, ‘White House suspends credentials for CNN’s Jim Acosta’, BBC News 
Online (8 November 2018). [accessed 8 November 2018].
Berkowitz, Dan and Douglas Adams, ‘Information Subsidy and Agenda-
Building in Local Television News’, Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly 
67 (4), (1990): 723–31.
Betz, David and Vaughan Phillips, ‘Putting the Strategy Back into Strategic 
Communications’, Defence Strategic Communications 3(Autumn), (2017): 41–69. 
Bolt, Neville, ‘Strategic Communications in Crisis’, The RUSI Journal 156(4), 
(2011): 44–53.
Bridge, Mark, ‘Tech Firms Have “Weaponised” Personal Data, Says Apple 
Chief  Tim Cook’, The Times (24 October 2018). [accessed 24 October 2018].
80
Defence Strategic Communications | Volume 5 | Autumn 2018
DOI 10.30966/2018.RIGA.5.2.
Brighton, Paul and Dennis Foy, News Values (London: Sage, 2007).
Bro, Peter and Filip Wallberg, Gatekeeping in a Digital Era, Journalism Practice 
9(1), (2015): 92–105.
Carlsson, Ulla and Reeta Pöyhtäri (eds), The Assault on Journalism: Building 
Knowledge to Protect Freedom of  Expression (Goteborg: Nordicom, University of  
Gothenburg, 2017).
Charron, Jean, ‘Relations between Journalists and Public Relations Practi-
tioners: Cooperation, Conflict and Negotiation’, Canadian Journal of  Communica-
tion 14(2) (1989): 41–54. 
Conboy, Martin, Journalism Studies: The Basics (London and New York: Rout-
ledge, 2013).
Cornish, Paul, Julian Lindley-French and Claire Yorke, Strategic Communications 
and National Strategy (A Chatham House Report, The Royal Institute of  Inter-
national Affairs, London: September 2011).
Department of  the Army, Psychological Operations (Field Manuel, 3-05.30: 
Washington, DC, 15 April 2005).
Deuze, Mark and Tamara Wutschge, ‘Beyond Journalism: Theorizing the 
Transformation of  Journalism’, Journalism 9(2), (2018): 165–85.
DiResta, Renee, Kris Shaffer, Becky Ruppel, David Sullivan, Robert Matney, 
Ryan Fox, Jonathan Albright, and Ben Johnson, The Tactics & Tropes of  the 
Internet Research Agency (A report by Knowledge, commissioned by the United 
States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC, released on 
17 December 2018), [accessed 18 December 2018].
Edwards, Lee, Defining the Object of  PublicRelations: A New Starting Point’, 
Public Relations Inquiry 1(1), (2012): 1–24. 
Farwell, James, Persuasion and Power: The Art of  Strategic Communication (Washing-
ton, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012).
Farwell, James, ‘The Media Strategy of  ISIS’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 
56(6), (2014): 49–55.
81
Defence Strategic Communications | Volume 5 | Autumn 2018
DOI 10.30966/2018.RIGA.5.2.
Freedman, Des, ‘“Public Service” and the Journalism Crisis: Is the BBC the 
Answer?’, Television & New Media (2018): 1–16.
Freedom House, ‘Freedom of  the Press 2015—Nigeria’, Freedom House (28 
April 2015). [accessed 28 April 2015].
Freedom House, ‘Freedom of  the Press 2017—Nigeria’, Freedom House (15 
May 2017). [accessed 19 December 2017].
Galtung, Johan and Mari Ruge, ‘The Structure of  Foreign News: The Presen-
tation of  the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus Crises in Four Norwegian Newspa-
pers’, Journal of Peace Research 2(1), (1965): 64–91.
Gandy, Oscar, Beyond Agenda Setting: Information Subsidies and Public Policy (Nor-
wood, N.J.: Ablex, 1982).
Ghosh, Dipayan and Ben Scott, Digital Deceit: The Technologies Behind Precision 
Propaganda on the Internet (Cambridge, MA: Shorenstein Center on Media, Poli-
tics and Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School, January 2018). 
Gilboa, Eytan, ‘Searching for a Theory of  Public Diplomacy’, Annals of  the 
American Academy 616, (2008): 55–77. DOI: 10.1177/0002716207312142
Gramsci, Antonio, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (edited and translated by 
Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 
1971).
Hallahan, Kirk, Derina Holtzhausen, Betteke van Ruler, Dejan Verčič and 
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